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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DISFIGUREMENT AWARDS
UNDER THE NEBRASKA STATUTES
In a recent Nebraska case' claimant suffered a compensable
accident resulting in a scar on his chin, loss of teeth, and an alleged
speech defect. After receiving medical benefits, 2 claimant applied
for disability benefits under Nebraska's Workmen's Compensation
Statute.3 The Nebraska Supreme Court held that in the absence
of proof that claimant's earning capacity had been impaired, he
was not entitled to disability benefits under the statute.
Nebraska has no statute specifically covering the problem of
disfigurement awards. Forty other jurisdictions have statutes4
mentioning and providing for disfigurement, either generally5 or
'Wengler v. Grosshans Lumber Co., 173 Neb. 839, 115 N.W.2d 415 (1962).
2 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1960) provides for "reasonable medi-
cal and hospital services and medicines as and when needed, subject to
the approval of the compensation court."
3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-101 to § 48-191 (Reissue 1960).
4 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 279 (1958); ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-3-1 (Supp.
1958); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1044 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(g)
(1947); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4660; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-12-6 (Supp.
1960); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-308 (Supp. 1961); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 2326 (Supp. 1960); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-501 (1951) (adopting 44
Stat. 1428 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 908(20) (1959)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15
(1952); HAwAII REV. LAWS § 97-26 (Supp. 1960); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 72-1017 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8 (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 40-1303 (Supp. 1962); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.110 (Supp.
1962); Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44
Stat. 1428 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 908(20) (1959) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.1221
(1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36 (1957); MINN. STAT. § 176.101 (1961);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 6998-09(24) (Supp. 1960); Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.190
(1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 92-709 (Supp. 1961); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 616.590 (Supp. 1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-18.5 (Supp. 1959); N.Y.
WORKMEN'S COMP. § 15(3); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1958); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 65-01-02(11) (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.57 (Page Supp.
1961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 22 (Supp. 1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 513 (Supp. 1961); Philippines; P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 11, § 3 (Supp. 1957);
S.C. CODE § 72-153 (1952); S.D. CODE § 64.0403(2) (1939); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1007 (Supp. 1962); TEx. REV. CIr. STAT. art. 8306 § 12 (Supp. 1962);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-66 (Supp. 1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-53 (1950);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.56 (Supp. 1962); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-83 (1957).
5 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.101 (1961) (for disfigurement not resulting
from the loss of a member or other injury); S.C. CODE § 72-153 (1952)
(facial, head or bodily disfigurement or injury to any member or organ
of body); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-66 (Supp. 1961) (for the loss of
bodily function not provided for or any other disfigurement).
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specifically,6 in many instances fixing maximums on awards that
may be given.7 Some of these statutes are premised on the theory
that disfigurement impairs the earning capacity of the injured
workman and should, to that extent, be compensable,8 while others
make the term "disfigurement" a "catch-all" for all injuries not
specifically covered by the schedules.9
II
The Nebraska statutes provide compensation under section
48-121(1) for "total disability"'1 and under section 48-121 (2) for
"disability partial in character, except the particular cases men-
tioned in subdivision (3) of this section."" In interpreting sub-
0 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-18.5 (Supp. 1959) (permanently dis-
figured about the head or face); OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 85, § 22 (Supp.
1962) (serious and permanent disfigurement of head, face, or hand);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.56 (Supp. 1962) (disfigurement about head, neck,
hand or arm).
7 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-12-6 (Supp. 1960) (maximum
$1,000); HAwAnI REV. LAWS § 97-26 (Supp. 1960) (maximum $7,000);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1958) (maximum $3,500).
8 See, e.g., Jolly v. Hampton & Sons Lumber Co., 353 S.W.2d 338 (Ark.
1962) (disfigurement of ear and face not compensable unless shown
to affect earning capacity). For collected cases see 11 ScHNEIDER, WoRK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 2337 at 626 n. 2 (3d ed. 1957).
9 See e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Wilson, 210 Md. 568, 124 A.2d 249 (1956)
(compensation awarded for disfigurement to parts of body usually cov-
ered by clothing); Shannon v. General Motors Corp., 52 Del. 524, 161
A.2d 433 (1960) (although recovery denied for small scar, impairment
of earning capacity not prerequisite to recovery); Arkin v. Industrial
Comm'n., 145 Colo. 463, 358 P.2d 879 (1961) (compensation for
loss of four teeth even though there were means of concealment);
Macaluso v. Schell-Wolfson, 56 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1952) (loss of
teeth compensable as "loss of function" even if dentures provided).
'ONEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(1) (Reissue 1960): "The following schedule of
compensation is hereby established for injuries resulting in disability:(1) For the first three hundred weeks of total disability, the compen-
sation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the wages received
at the time of injury . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
1NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(2) (Reissue 1960): "For disability partial in
character, except the particular cases mentioned in subdivision (3) of this
section, the compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of
the difference between the wages received at the time of the injury and
the earning power of the employee thereafter . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Section 48-121(3) lists certain scheduled injuries and states in part:
"Should the employer and the employee be unable to agree upon the
amount of compensation to be paid in cases not covered by the schedule,
the amount of compensation shall be settled according to the provisions
of sections 48-173 to 48-185."
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divisions (1) and (2), the Nebraska Supreme Court has found
"disability" to mean the impairment of earning capacity, 12 and
such impairment must be shown before compensation will result.
"Disability" in terms of earning capacity, however, apparently is
not at issue in the scheduled injuries set out in section 48-121 (3) as
it is under section 48-121 (1) and (2). Under the scheduled injuries
listed in section 48-121 (3) it has been held that it is immaterial
whether an industrial disability is present or not.13 It may be
questioned whether this. ability to receive compensation under
section 48-121 (3) without proving any diminution of earning ca-
pacity is, in fact, consistent wth the court's requirement that im-
pairment of earning capacity be established before compensation
will be granted under section 48-121 (1) or (2). Under this inter-
pretation of section 48-121 and these standards of proof, a watch-
maker who loses a leg is entitled to immediate compensation be-
cause the loss of a leg is specifically covered by the schedule under
subdivision (3) 1 even though his present earning capacity may not
have been impaired. However, since he receives compensation
under section 48-121(3), he is not required to show any diminution
of earning capacity-present or future. A workman, however, who
receives an injury which is not specifically covered by the schedule
under subdivision (3) must receive compensation, if he is to receive
it at all, under section 48-121 (1) or (2) and therefore, has the
added burden of proving impairment of earning capacity. This
distinction may, perhaps be explained by saying that one of the
prime objectives of workmen's compensation is to get the compen-
sation to the worker immediately. It is therefore in the interest of
this objective that the scheduled injuries be promptly compensated
without additional proof of diminution of earning capacity and,
consequently, without additional delay. Furthermore, the injuries
specifically covered by the schedule are of a commonly recurrent
nature, being, in and of themselves, serious enough to be presump-
tive proof of diminution of earning capacity, either present or
future.
12Thinnes v. Kearney Packing Co., 173 Neb. 123, 112 N.W.2d 732 (1962);
Pavel v. Hughes Bros., 167 Neb. 727, 94 N.W.2d 492 (1959); Miller
v. Peterson, 165 Neb. 344, 85 N.W.2d 575 (1957).
13Paulson v. Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 1012, 26 N.W.2d 11 (1947);
Bronson v. City of Fremont, 143 Neb. 281, 9 N.W.2d 218 (1943).
14 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(3) (Reissue 1960) ("for the loss of a leg, sixty-
six and two-thirds per cent of daily wages during two hundred fifteen
weeks").
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III
Although the Nebraska statutes do not specifically mention dis-
figurement, Nebraska apparently follows the majority of states in
granting compensation for disfigurement if the disfigurement im-
pairs the earning capacity of the injured claimant. In the leading
Nebraska case and the only one prior to Wengler specifically dealing
with the disfigurement problem, Wilson v. Brown-McDonald,15
claimant, a salesman, received severe facial disfigurement while
working within the scope of his employment. He was awarded
compensation even though the statute made no specific provision
therefor. Claimant in Wilson based his claim on section 48-121 (3)
which states in part: "should the employer and employe be unable
to agree upon the amount of compensation to be paid in cases not
covered by the schedule, the amount of compensation shall be set-
tled according to the provisions of sections 48-173 to 48-185."16 The
court concluded that this section and the procedure set out in sec-
tions 48-173 to 48-185 "leaves the matter of award and the degree
of disability for this court to determine."'1 In order for the court
to determine the "degree of disability", i.e. to determine whether
the disability is total or partial, the court needs, under section
48-121 (1) or (2), proof of diminution of earning capacity. Con-
sequently, even though the injury is covered by the language in sub-
division (3), the court, without specifically so stating, is removing
the injury from subdivision (3) and placing it under either sub-
division (1) or (2) and requiring proof of earning capacity im-
pairment.18 Claimant in Wilson, a salesman, furnished that prooft0
15 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
'GNEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(3) (Emphasis added.) Sections 48-173 to 48-185
set out the procedure to be followed by a claimant in applying for com-
pensation and also the procedure to be followed on any appeal.
17Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 224, 278 N.W. 254, 261(1938).
Is "The term wages is not a complete synonym for earning power. The
ability to earn wages in one's employment is, obviously, a primary base
in the admeasurement of earning power, but several other component
factors are also involved. These include eligibility to procure employ-
ment generally, ability to hold a job obtained and capacity to perform
the tasks of the work in which engaged. If any one or more of these
four elements of earning power are affected and only partially impaired,
as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment,
and the disability is not one covered by subdivision 3 of section 48-121,
Comp. St. 1929, the right to compensation is governed by subdivision
2 of such section." Micek v. Omaha Steel Works, 136 Neb. 843, 848, 287
N.W. 645, 648 (1939).
19 "To say the least, his facial appearance and disfigurement are of such
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and the court concluded that since his earning capacity had been
so greatly impaired,2 0 he was totally disabled 2' within the meaning
of the act and entitled to compensation.
In the instant case, claimant alleged that since he had received
a compensable injury,22 the court should grant compensation under
section 48-121(3) irrespective of impairment of earning capacity.
He apparently relied on the theory that previous cases 23 had
made it clear that for scheduled injuries under section 48-121 (3)
he was not required to advance any evidence that his earning
capacity had been impaired. In fact, he conceded that his "earn-
ing capacity had not been impaired. '24 He assumed that he was
free from proving diminution of earning power if he could bring
his injury under the language of section 48-121(3). The court
apparently held, however, that the mere fact that his injury is
covered by the words in subdivision (3)-"cases not covered by
a character that he will be greatly handicapped in procuring employ-
ment on the open labor market. The evidence adduced in the record is
clear in this respect." Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 225,
278 N.W. 254, 261 (1938). (Emphasis added.)
20 "His injuries are the sole and only reason for his inability to obtain or
perform work in the line for which he was trained or is fitted. If he
obtained employment, he could not perform the work. The very nature
of his work would require him to meet the public, where appearance
most assuredly would seriously handicap him in using his ability as a
salesman and place him at a great disadvantage in competition with other
salesmen, and in fact, would rule him out altogether." Wilson v. Brown-
McDonald Co., supra note 19, at 225, 278 N.W. at 262.
21 "[S]uffice it to say, that the very nature of the third-degree burns, re-
sulting in the severe facial disfigurement of the claimant, totally and
permanently disable him, and for reasons stated in this opinion we be-
lieve that he was totally and permanently disabled from the date of
the accident.... ." Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 225, 278
N.W. 254, 262 (1938); accord, Knaggs v. City of Lexington, 171 Neb. 135,
105 N.W.2d 727 (1960) ; Rapp v. Hale, 170 Neb. 620, 103 N.W.2d 851 (1960) ;
Miller v. Peterson 165 Neb. 344, 85 N.W.2d 575 (1957); Haler v. Gering
Bean Co., 162 Neb. 748, 82 N.W.2d 152 (1957); Franzen v. Blakely, 155
Neb. 621, 52 N.W.2d 833 (1952); Ludwickson v. Central States Elec.
Co., 135 Neb. 371, 281 N.W. 603 (1938).
22 Appellant argued that since he had met the four prerequisites to a com-
pensable claim: (1) an injury; (2) an accident; (3) accident arose out
of and in the course of his employment; and (4) no willful negligence
on his part, the court should be governed by section 48-109-"which
compensation shall be paid in every case" and should grant him compen-
sation for his disfigurement." (Emphasis added.)
23 Cases cited note 13 supra.
24 Brief for Appellant, p. 34, Wengler v. Grosshans Lumber Co., 173 Neb.
839, 115 N.W.2d 415 (1962).
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the schedule"--does not necessarily free a claimant from the burden
of showing diminution of earning capacity. It is submitted that
these words merely give the court the right to determine the
amount of the compensation and the degree of disability.25 To reach
a determination of whether the injury is "total" (covered by sec-
tion 48-121 (1)) or "partial" (covered by section 48-121 (2)) the
court, in effect, is saying that the injury, since it is not specifically
covered by the schedule, no longer is included under subdivision
(3) but under either subdivision (1) or (2), both of which require
proof of diminution of earning capacity to establish disability.
Consequently, since claimant in Wengler failed to advance any
evidence that the scar on his chin, his loss of teeth or alleged speech
defect would in any way impair his earning power, the court held
that he was not entitled to compensation under section 48-121.
The apparent holding in the Wengler case is that while dis-
figurement is a compensable injury under the Nebraska Work-
men's Compensation Statute, the language in section 48-121 (3),
with respect to "cases not covered by the schedule" does not, in and
of itself, cover disfigurement where no evidence of "disability" is
presented to the court. Viewed in this light the Wengler decision
is reconcilable with the earlier Wilson decision. While both cases
were tried under the same wording of the statute-section 48-121 (3)
-both injuries were, in reality covered by section 48-121 (1) or (2),
requiring proof of impairment of earning capacity. Claimant in
Wilson proved "disability" in terms of earning capacity while
claimant in Wengler conceded that his earning power was not, to
any degree, diminished.20
25 The Nebraska Supreme Court stated in Wilson that "the instant case is
not covered by schedule, but recovery is permitted by the use of the
language, 'in cases not covered by the schedule,' contained in section
48-121, Comp. St. 1929, which leaves the matter of award and the degree
of disability for this court to determine." Wilson v. Brown-McDonald
Co., 134 Neb. 211, 224, 278 N.W. 254, 261 (1938).
2 0 Whether it is socially desirable to base compensation in this area upon
the earning capacity concept or whether some broader standard should
be adopted is an issue beyond the scope of this article. For an analysis
of the difference between workmen's compensation and social insurance
see 1 LARsON, WoPamw's CO1VIPENSATION LAw § 3 at 13 (1952). It has
even been suggested that in this area of disfigurement, the legislatures
should perhaps restore the common law remedies. 2 LARsoN, WosCMEN's
COMPENSATIoN LAw § 65.40 at 140 (1952).
For disfigurement in general see 11 SCHNEIDER, WOmMEN's COMPEN-
SATION TEXT § 2337 at 625 (3d ed. 1957); Annot., 80 A.L.R. 970; 116 A.L.R.
702.
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IV
The confusing feature of the Wengler decision is the fact that
the opinion uses language which has two unfortunate and probably
unintended implications. The first of these is the inference that
disfigurement injuries are only compensable when "total" disability
and not mere "partial" disability results.2 7 The opinion can be
read literally as saying that a claimant can recover for disfigure-
ment only if he is "totally" disabled under section 48-121 (1) and
if he shows that his earning power has been "greatly handicapped"28
by the injury. The only factual difference, other than impairment
of earning capacity, it is submitted, between Wilson and Wengler
is the degree of disfigurement. The disfigurement in the Wilson
case resulted in "total" disability to the injured salesman, while
the disfigurement in the Wengler case resulted, perhaps, in only
"partial" disability. It is submitted that,.if claimant in Wengler
could have shown partial impairment of earning power because of
the disfigurement, he could have received compensation under sec-
tion 48-121 (2) and nothing in either the Wilson decision or the
Wengler holding is contrary to such compensation.
The second inference is that "there is no 'disability' if the
employee is receiving the same wages in the same or any other
employment. '29 This language is misleading because, while it makes
sense on the facts of this case, it is much narrower than the court's
previous definition of "disability." Previously, "disability" was
defined in terms of "earning capacity", and "earning capacity" in
terms of employability. "Earning capacity" means not only the
ability to perform the same work or like work at the same rate of
27 "The evidence in the instant case shows no such facial disfigurement as
appeared in the case of Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., supra, nor does
it show total permanent disability as appeared by the evidence in that
case. The cited case [Wilson] is no authority supporting the plaintiff's
claim for compensation." Wengler v. Grosshans Lumber Co., 173 Neb.
839, 849, 115 N.W.2d 415, 421 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
28 There is language in the Wilson decision which indicates that perhaps
the injury must be severe to the extent that not only would claimant
be handicapped in getting future employment but that he would be
"greatly handicapped," e.g., "severely" burned; "shockingly" disfigured;
"greatly" handicapped; "seriously" handicapped; "third-degree burns";
"severe" facial disfigurement. However, if a claimant could show only
partial disability, it is submitted that the Nebraska Supreme Court would
have a difficult time denying recovery in light of the reasoning used in
the Wilson case.
29 Wengler v. Grosshans Lumber Co., 173 Neb. 839, 850, 115 N.W.2d 415,
421 (1962).
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pay, but also the ability to secure employment on the open labor
market.30 If claimant in Wengler could have shown that his future
quests for employment on the open labor market would, to some
degree, be hampered because of the disfigurement, he should be
allowed compensation for "partial disability."
V
However, in spite of the misleading dictum, one thing appears
certain after the Wengler decision. A claimant who receives a dis-
figurement injury and brings his claim under the language of
section 48-121(3), must nevertheless prove impairment of earning
capacity-either total or partial-to receive compensation under
the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Statute.
William D. Kuester '64
30 See note 18 supra.
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